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clear that a vision of the future free of the oppressive conditions of white 
supremacy and settler colonialism was something some Indian people were 
invested in thinking about. This is a clear statement on race in the United 
States, which Andersson (like other scholars of the ghost dance) seems to 
overlook.
Another concern pertains to the fact that there are very few women in 
this book. Is it possible to provide a comprehensive overview of Lakota 
perspectives on the Ghost Dance that does not include the perspectives of 
Native American women? To his credit, Andersson acknowledges this ab-
sence, though justifies it by explaining that “only a few women have left 
written accounts of the Ghost Dance” (31). Historians can surely sympa-
thize with the problem of limitations to sources, but gender-blind inter-
pretations like Andersson’s tend to be less an issue of absence than of not 
knowing where to look. The danger of stating that Native women simply 
did not leave written accounts is the potential that readers may simply ac-
cept the idea that female voices are mute and inaccessible in the historical 
record. 
Despite these shortcomings, Andersson has given readers an unprec-
edented collection of published and unpublished material on the Ghost 
Dance among Lakotas. This contribution is sure to inspire more historical 
investigation and analysis of a movement that scholars have only begun to 
understand on its own terms.
Tiffany Hale      Columbia University
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This book attempts to explain how Trump’s 2016 victory could happen in 
spite of several anti-Trump narratives that formed during the campaign, 
focusing on Trump voters’ worldview(s), conservative media, and the trans-
formation of the Republican Party since the late 1960s. It is essayistic and 
polemic, written by an author who shares the widespread concern about the 
consequences of the Trump presidency for liberal democracy. 
While the author draws on lots of relevant previous work, his discussion 
of Trump’s victory centers on familiar themes and arguments. The book 
115REVIEWS
116 American Studies in Scandinavia, 51:1
does not offer any unique, new perspectives, as far as I am able to tell. It 
is short and, in my view, superficial in its treatment of the hypothesized 
causal factors. Much of the text consists of summaries of and references 
to the work of others. In that sense, it is very referential and descriptive. 
I was unable to identify Kivisto’s own argument; an argument that makes 
a novel contribution to the public discourse and/or the existing literature 
on the Trump phenomenon, the 2016 election, the far right in the U.S., its 
worldview(s) and role in and impact on American politics. So much has 
already been written on the social and cultural forces that made Trump pos-
sible, for instance by Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto in their 
insightful book Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reac-
tionary Politics in America, which is not cited in the book. Moreover, given 
the emphasis on populism in the book title, I was surprised by how little 
attention the author devoted to the concept of populism – whether one con-
siders it an ideology, a communicative style, or a form of leader-centered 
political mobilization/political strategy (see e.g. Gidron and Bonikowski), 
populism in American politics, and the explanations of populism from the 
vast literature on it. Populism is a defining feature of American political 
culture, and I would have liked to see Trump discussed within the con-
text of other populist leaders and movements in American political history, 
from Andrew Jackson, the Know Nothing Party, The Populist Party (of the 
1890s), William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long (whom the author does men-
tion), George Wallace, Ross Perot to Sarah Palin. 
I also believe much of the public discussion about Trump’s victory is 
premised on an unrealistic belief in Habermasian deliberative democracy. 
After all, much political science research has shown that people rarely 
change their views; emotions come before facts, in many instances. More-
over, party identification is a very powerful predictor of voter behavior. I 
co-authored an op-ed in 2013 predicting the GOP’s victory in 2016 (Grend-
stad and Mjelde). Since World War II, the 1980 election is the only time 
when a party did not get two consecutive terms in the White House (when 
Bush 41 lost in 1992, the GOP had been in power since 1980). In elec-
toral forecasting, we disregard campaigns and predict outcomes based on 
the state of the economy and the number of years the incumbent party has 
held the White House. Campaign events tend to cancel each other out. To 
the extent that campaigns shape the outcomes of presidential elections, the 
“time for change” message is particularly powerful after a party has held 
the White House for eight years. For these reasons, I expected Trump to win 
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in 2016, and in my assessment, Kivisto’s discussion would have benefited 
from a consideration of these dynamics. After all, Trump was the Republi-
can nominee, benefiting from voters’ familiarity and identification with the 
GOP party brand. Put differently, many voted for Trump simply because he 
was the Republican nominee in the U.S. two-party system. 
Furthermore, in an August 2015 op-ed in the Norwegian broadsheet Af-
tenposten, I argued that Trump could very well become president (Mjelde). 
His name recognition, media savviness, and financial resources ensured his 
viability. The importance of these factors is stressed in any textbook on 
American presidential campaigns (see e.g. Polsby et al.) and received insuf-
ficient attention in the assessments of Trump’s chances. Moreover, within 
the mediatization of politics literature, the sub-literature on media populism 
offers many insights that suggested that Trump would be a force to be reck-
oned with in the 2016 campaign (Mazzoleni).
Finally, I believe fears about Trump are often exaggerated, and the warn-
ings overstated. To be sure, he has emboldened the far right and cheap-
ened and coarsened public discourse with his often uncivil rhetoric. This 
is a legitimate cause for concern. But the U.S. political system, with its 
separation of powers and checks and balances, is an extremely robust one 
designed to withstand demagogues like Trump. Even if he tried to abolish 
elections or ban the media – which he has not, he wouldn’t have been able 
to. The U.S. is still a country of democratic institutions and norms. Al-
though I worry a lot about the polarization of the electorate along ideologi-
cal, ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic lines, particularly in a country 
with hundreds of millions of firearms in the hands of ordinary people, I 
believe both the presidency and the U.S. democracy can handle Trump. 
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